A recent decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division has sent back for retrial a dispute involving claims that a landlord overcharged rent beyond what is allowed under local law, raising questions about how municipal ordinances interact with state consumer protection statutes. The case highlights ongoing concerns for tenants and landlords regarding compliance with rent-control rules and the procedures required to enforce them.
The appeal was filed by Marc Celler, who brought his complaint before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County (Docket No. L-4735-19) against 1017 Park Avenue, LLC, the Estate of Vincenza Petruzzella, Gaetano Petruzzella, Vito Petruzzella, and Lazzaro Petruzzella. The appellate panel issued its opinion on March 2, 2026.
According to court documents, Celler leased an apartment from the defendants between 2015 and 2020. On December 8, 2019, he filed suit alleging that the defendants charged him monthly rents exceeding amounts permitted by Hoboken’s rent-control ordinance (Hoboken Code §155-4), which sets limits on allowable rent increases for certain apartments. Celler sought $7,526 in alleged overpayments as well as treble damages under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. He claimed that from 2015 to 2020 he was charged more than what was legally permissible under city regulations.
Defendants countered by asserting that Celler had failed to pay the correct legal rent after accounting for a tax surcharge approved by Hoboken’s Rent Leveling and Stabilization Board. This surcharge amounted to $329 per month for one year beginning May 2019 and was granted to landlords of rent-controlled apartments.
During litigation, both sides moved for summary judgment—requests for rulings without trial based on undisputed facts—but were denied by two different judges at separate times. The first judge found that while there was no factual dispute that “plaintiff paid rent in excess of the Rent Leveling Board’s maximum allowable rent,” issues remained regarding whether proper notice had been given to support passing along tax surcharges as increased rent. The judge also determined that Hoboken’s two-year statute of limitations applied to refund requests but denied both parties’ motions due to unresolved factual questions.
A second round of summary judgment motions produced similar results. The second judge calculated that Celler had paid $7,526 above legal rents but emphasized that recovery is limited by ordinance to two years’ worth of overpayments. After offsetting this amount with legally permissible surcharges transferred to Celler ($329 per month for twelve months), the judge concluded that Celler actually owed money back to defendants rather than having suffered an “ascertainable loss” required under the CFA.
Both motions for reconsideration were also denied by their respective judges. One judge acknowledged plaintiff’s argument about improper notice but maintained that any recovery prior to January 2018 was time-barred due to when the complaint was filed.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial before a third judge on October 2, 2023; however, no testimony or evidence was presented at trial because both parties stipulated—or agreed—to rely on facts previously found during summary judgment proceedings. Plaintiff’s counsel asked for damages based on those findings while defense counsel requested affirmation of earlier decisions denying relief.
The trial court adopted previous findings without additional analysis or clarification and entered a “no cause” verdict against Celler—effectively dismissing his claims.
On appeal, Celler argued that all summary judgment denials were improper because there were no genuine issues left unresolved; he further contended that procedural missteps—including failure by defendants to serve required disclosure statements—should have reset limitation periods under local law. He also raised arguments about whether state law preempts local time limits for bringing such claims.
The appellate panel affirmed denial of summary judgment and reconsideration motions but found fault with how the bench trial was conducted: “the trial court’s merely ‘affirming’ the summary judgment findings failed in these circumstances to meet the requirement [that] the trial court make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Noting ambiguity in what facts were actually stipulated at trial—and conflicting positions taken by each side—the panel held it could not determine if proper legal standards had been applied or if key factual disputes had been resolved.
Accordingly, the appellate division vacated (set aside) the order finding no cause against plaintiff and remanded (sent back) the case for a new trial so that clear factual findings and legal conclusions could be made based on evidence presented.
Attorneys listed in connection with this case include John V. Salierno (Law Offices of Peter W. Till) representing appellant Marc Celler and Alberico De Pierro (De Pierro Radding LLC) representing respondents. The appellate opinion does not explicitly name any judges beyond referencing Judges Gooden Brown and Torregrossa-O’Connor as presiding over arguments at appeal level; three different unnamed judges handled various orders at earlier stages according to filings. The case is identified as Docket No. A-2954-23.
Source: A295423_Celler_v_1017_Park_Avenue_LLC_Opinion_New_Jersey_Superior_Court_of_Appeals.pdf