Laws requiring citizens to immediately disclose the presence of a lawfully stored handgun during routine police stops are being challenged in federal court, with claims that such mandates impose criminal liability on otherwise lawful conduct and burden constitutional rights. The complaint was filed by Dwight D. Mitchell in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on April 13, 2026, naming Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Col. Jeanne Hengemuhle, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, as defendants.
According to the filing, Mitchell is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He contests the constitutionality of specific provisions within N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4.4(b)(1), (b)(2), and (c)—referred to as the “Mandates”—which require permit holders to immediately disclose firearm possession when stopped or detained by law enforcement while carrying a handgun in public or traveling with one in a motor vehicle. These statutes also compel permit holders to display their permits upon request and surrender firearms for inspection if detained as part of a criminal investigation.
Mitchell’s complaint states that these requirements force him to choose between engaging in lawful conduct—such as transporting an unloaded, locked handgun in his vehicle—and risking criminal prosecution for failing to meet undefined standards of “immediate” disclosure or production of documentation. He argues that this situation results in a present and ongoing injury because he has ceased transporting firearms outside his home since November 2025 due to fear of prosecution under these laws.
The plaintiff outlines several constitutional grounds for his challenge:
– **Second Amendment**: Mitchell claims that conditioning lawful public carriage on compelled disclosure, permit display, and firearm surrender burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment’s plain text.
– **First Amendment**: He alleges that being forced to speak about possessing a firearm during routine stops constitutes compelled speech prohibited by the First Amendment.
– **Fourth Amendment**: The requirement to surrender a secured firearm for inspection without individualized suspicion is argued to be an unreasonable seizure.
– **Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process/Vagueness)**: The complaint highlights that terms like “immediately” are undefined in statute, inviting arbitrary enforcement and failing to provide fair notice.
– **Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)**: Mitchell asserts that only permit holders are subject to these heightened duties—even when their conduct is indistinguishable from other lawful gun owners—creating an irrational classification based solely on permit status.
– **Supremacy Clause/Federal Preemption**: For interstate travel covered by federal law (18 U.S.C. § 926A), he contends that New Jersey’s mandates stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objective of ensuring safe passage for travelers lawfully transporting firearms between jurisdictions where possession is legal.
The complaint describes how these statutes operate during ordinary roadside encounters: failure to immediately disclose or produce a physical permit card can result in arrestable offenses even if the individual remains validly licensed; subsequent escalation may lead officers to demand turnover of firearms for inspection under circumstances not necessarily related to safety concerns or dangerousness.
Mitchell emphasizes that he does not seek broad changes to New Jersey’s firearms code but rather a narrow injunction preventing enforcement of these mandates as applied to peaceful transport of unloaded, secured handguns not readily accessible during vehicle travel. He states his intent is not to interfere with officer safety measures justified by individualized facts but challenges what he calls categorical felony-grade duties imposed absent any such findings.
The legal arguments presented reference recent Supreme Court decisions clarifying historical analysis required for evaluating modern gun regulations (including Bruen and Rahimi) as well as precedents concerning compelled speech (Wooley v. Maynard; Barnette) and due process standards for vagueness (Kolender v. Lawson).
Mitchell seeks prospective relief from the court—including preliminary injunctions—to allow him and similarly situated individuals to resume lawful public carriage without facing what he describes as unconstitutional burdens or risks of prosecution under current state law.
He represents himself pro se in this action; no attorneys or judges are named explicitly in the provided document text. The case is identified as Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-03986-MAS-RLS.
Source: 326cv03986_Mitchell_v_Davenport_Complaint_District_New_Jersey.pdf
