A recent decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, has confirmed that a woman who purchased a German Shepherd through Craigslist must return the dog to its original owner after a contractual dispute over ownership and return conditions. The ruling addresses how agreements for pet sales are interpreted under state law and highlights issues surrounding oral contracts and emotional attachments to animals.
The appeal was filed by Katherine Walker, who represented herself, against Takea Williamson in Middlesex County under Docket No. SC-000147-24. The opinion was submitted on March 17, 2026, and decided on April 1, 2026. Walker challenged an earlier Special Civil Part order from April 8, 2025, which required her to return the dog Koa to Williamson as the lawful owner.
According to court documents, Williamson had owned Koa for over a year before deciding to sell her in January 2024. On January 27, 2024, Walker responded to Williamson’s Craigslist advertisement offering Koa for $200. They agreed on this price and met at Roosevelt Park in Edison on February 6, 2024, where Koa was transferred after payment via Zelle. At trial, Williamson testified that during this exchange she made it clear that if she ever wanted Koa back, Walker would be willing to return her—a point that became central in later legal arguments.
Two days after the transfer, Williamson contacted Walker expressing regret about selling Koa and asked for her return. She offered not only to reimburse the purchase price but also any veterinary expenses incurred by Walker. Initially, Walker asked for time to consider but ultimately refused to return Koa after consulting with her boyfriend Paul Colontino. In response, Williamson filed suit seeking specific performance—the legal remedy compelling the return of Koa.
After an initial dismissal due to Williamson missing a virtual trial date (which was later vacated), proceedings resumed with both parties presenting their cases at trial. Williamson maintained there was an oral agreement regarding the right of return; Walker denied such an understanding existed and argued she intended for Koa to become her service animal.
Walker’s defense included testimony from her psychotherapist about her need for an emotional support animal due to diagnosed anxiety disorders and attachment issues. However, the trial court found more credibility in Williamson’s account and noted text messages supporting the claim that there was indeed discussion about returning Koa if requested within a reasonable period.
The trial court reasoned: “the nature of the agreement … included _a right for [plaintiff] …to ask for the return of the dog so long as…the request…was made within a reasonable time period.” The judge also observed that while pets are considered personal property under law, their intrinsic value can be considered when determining custody or ownership disputes.
Walker appealed several aspects of this decision: she argued there was no valid agreement granting Williamson a right of return; that any such term would be unconscionable; that relevant communications did not include such terms; and that she should not have been required to disclose personal mental health information prior to purchase.
The appellate panel reviewed these claims de novo where appropriate—especially regarding contract interpretation—and affirmed all findings by the lower court. It concluded that sufficient credible evidence supported integrating a “right of return” into their agreement based on testimony and contemporaneous text messages: “I was really hoping that you meant what you said about giving her back if I had ever changed my mind.” The judges also found no procedural or substantive unconscionability in enforcing this term given both parties’ conduct.
On other points raised by Walker—including arguments related to statute of frauds requirements (which do not apply under $500), parol evidence rule limitations (since partial integration allows extrinsic evidence), breach or rescission standards under contract law or Uniform Commercial Code provisions—the appellate division rejected each argument as unsupported by fact or law in this context.
Ultimately, Walker’s request for reimbursement of post-trial expenses related to caring for Koa was denied except allowing retention of the original $200 payment since medical costs offset this amount.
Attorneys listed on briefs were Elizabeth D. Burke and Elizabeth M. Foster-Fernandez representing appellant Katherine Walker; respondent Takea Williamson did not file a brief in opposition during appeal proceedings. The case is identified as A-2818-24.
Source: A281824_Williamson_v_Walker_Opinion_New_Jersey_Superior_Court_of_Appeals.pdf
